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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
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vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS 
ASSOCIATION, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14635 
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. AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
Appeal from a Judgment of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County 
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PETITION FOR REHEARING .... 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REHEARING 
NATURE OF CASE . . . . • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT. 
POINT I. THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS 
DECISION EXCLUSIVELY ON THE PROVISIONS 
OF SECTION 5 OF THE SUBJECT LEASE 
AGREEMENT WHILE FAILING TO CONSIDER 
OR ADDRESS THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 
8 AND 11 WHICH WERE RELIED UPON BY 
THE TRIAL COURT AND WHICH WERE URGED 
• 1 
2 
2 
2 
• • 3 
• 3 
BY RESPONDENT AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL . . . 3 
POINT II. 
POINT III. 
CONCLUSION. . 
THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING WITH 
RESPECT TO SECTION 5 OF THE SUB-
JECT LEASE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT PRE-
CLUDE SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
JUDGMENT ON THE THEORY OF BREACH OF 
CONTRACT UNDER THE TERMS OF SECTIONS 
8 AND 11 OF THE AGREEMENT ...• 
THE SUPREME COURT HAS A DUTY TO 
AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT IF SUSTAINABLE UPON ANY 
LEGAL GROUND OR THEORY APPARENT 
ON THE RECORD. 
i 
••• 5 
•. 10 
• .12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 
(1963). . . . • . . . . . . . . . . 
Foss, Lewis & Sons Const. Co. v. General Ins. Co. 
. 10 
of America, 30 Utah 2d 290, 517 P.2d 539 (1973) .. 11 
Goodsel v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1974). • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11 
John P. Gorman Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 
213 Ky . 5 5 1 , 2 81 S . W . 4 8 7 ( 19 2 6 ) . . 8 
Jones v. Smith, 550 P.2d 194 (Utah 1976) 12 
Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. Co. v. Anthony, 199 F.Supp. 
286 (W.D. Ark. 1961), aff'd 316 F.2d 858 
(8th Cir. 1963), cert.-a:enied 375 U.S. 830 
(1963). • • . • • . • . . . . . . 
Minneapolis-Moline Co. v. Chicago, M., ST. P. & 
P. R. Co., 199 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1952) .. 
Northern P. Ry. Co. v. National Cylinder G. Div. 
of C.C., 2 Wash.App. 338, 467 P.2d 884 
(Wash. 1970) ....•.•.•..... 
Peterson v. Fowler, 29 Utah 2d 366, 510 P.2d 523 
9 
6 
8 
(1973). • • • • . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . 11 
ii Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS 
ASSOCIATION, a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14635 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, plaintiff and 
respondent herein, petitions the court for a rehearing on 
the following grounds: 
1. The Supreme Court erred in basing its 
decision exclusively on the provisions of Section 
5 of the subject lease agreement while failing to 
consider or address the provisions of Sections 8 
and 11 which were relied upon by the trial court 
and which were urged by respondent at trial and 
on appeal. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. The Supreme Court's reasoning with respect 
to Section 5 of the subject lease agreement would 
not preclude sustaining the trial court's judgment 
on the theory of breach of contract under the 
terms of Sections 8 and 11 of the agreement. 
3. The Supreme Court has a duty to affirm the 
decision of the trial court if sustainable upon 
any legal ground or theory apparent on the record. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REHEARING 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a case where the Utah Supreme Court, in 
reversing the decision of the trial court, failed to con-
sider or address the basis upon which the trial court's 
decision rested. Instead, this court based its decision 
exclusively upon a peripheral issue advanced by the appell-
ant while ignoring the real issue in dispute which was de-
cided in favor of the petitioner at trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petitioner seeks reargument and reconsideration of 
the merits of this case; consideration of the issue upon 
which the trial court's decision was based, said issue hav-
ing been ignored by this court during the previous appeal; 
and adherence to the self-imposed mandate of this court to 
-2-
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affirm the decision of the trial court if sustainable upon 
any legal ground apparent on the record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was submitted to the trial court on 
stipulated facts. A copy of that stipulation, without 
exhibits, is attached hereto for the court's convenient 
reference. 
A complete statement of contractual provisions 
upon which the trial court based its decision, and which 
were ignored by this court on appeal, is as follows (Tr. 
7-8): 
Section 8. No building, platform or 
other structure shall be erected or main-
tained and no material or obstruction of 
any kind or character shall be placed, 
piled, stored, stacked or maintained 
closer than eight (8) feet six (6) inches 
to the center line of the nearest track 
of the Lessor; . 
Section 11. The Lessee shall be lia-
ble for any and all injury or damage to 
persons or property, of whatsoever nature 
or kind, arising out of or contributed to 
by any breach in whole or in part of any 
covenant of this agreement. [Emphasis 
added.] 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS DECI-
SION EXCLUSIVELY ON THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5 
-3-
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OF THE SUBJECT LEASE AGREEMENT WHILE FAILING TO 
CONSIDER OR ADDRESS THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 8 
AND 11 WHICH WERE RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT 
AND WHICH WERE URGED BY RESPONDENT AT TRIAL AND 
ON APPEAL. 
At trial and on appeal petitioner actively assert-
ed that it should recover on the basis of Sections 8 and 11 
of the subject lease agreement under which appellant's lia-
bility attaches from breach of its contractual duty as 
distinguished from liability arising solely from negligence 
or tort. The trial court's conclusions of law, providing 
in part that "The court further concludes that the negli-
gence of either party is not an issue nor a necessary ele-
ment to the conclusion of this case" (Tr. 155), are compati-
ble with this theory. 
A complete statement of Sections 8 and 11 of the 
subject lease is as follows (Tr. 8): 
Section 8. No building, platform or 
other structure shall be erected or main-
tained and no material or obstruction of 
any kind or character shall be placed, 
piled, stored, stacked or maintained 
closer than eight (8) feet six (6) 
inches to the center line of the nearest 
track of the Lessor; • • • 
Section 11. The Lessee shall be lia-
ble for any and all injury or damage to 
persons or property, of whatsoever nature 
or kind, arising out of or contributed to 
by any breach in whole or in part of any 
covenant of this agreement. [Emphasis 
added.] 
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Upon appeal appellant addressed only Section 5 
of the lease agreement, a general indemnity provision, upon 
which petitioner relied as an alternative theory for recov-
ery and ignored Sections 8 and 11 altogether. This Court 
followed appellant's lead and reversed the trial court, 
discussing only its finding of inadequacy as to Section 5 
while omitting any consideration of petitioner's primary 
contention. 
In light of the fact that petitioner was the pre-
vailing party at trial and that judgment was based upon 
Sections 8 and 11, it is submitted that the Supreme Court 
erred in failing to consider or address the merits of 
recovery on the basis of those sections. 
POINT II 
THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING WITH RESPECT 
TO SECTION 5 OF THE SUBJECT LEASE AGREEMENT 
WOULD NOT PRECLUDE SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
JUDGMENT ON THE THEORY OF BREACH OF CONTRACT 
UNDER THE TERMS OF SECTIONS 8 AND 11 OF THE 
AGREEMENT. 
It is significant to note that the provisions of 
Sections 8 and 11 of the subject agreement do not mention 
the concept of negligence and/or fault. Section 8 exacts 
a covenant from Intermountain Farmers Association not to 
place, pile, store, stack or maintain any materials or 
-5-
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obstructions of any kind or character closer than 8 1 6 11 to 
the center line of the nearest Union Pacific track. Section 
11 provides that Intermountain Farmers Association shall be 
liable for any and all injuries to any person "arising out 
of or contributed to by any breach in whole or in part of 
any covenant of this agreement" (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that at the time Mr. Richins sus-
tained his injury the spool of cable which his foot hit was 
located within the proscribed clearance zone (Stipulation, 
,, 26). Furthermore, it is also undisputed that Intermoun-
tain Farmers owned the spool of cable (Stipulation, ,,,, 5, 
25, and 28) which caused Mr. Richins' injuries. Consequent-
ly, it is clear that the provisions of Section 8 of the 
agreement were breached by the mere existence of this spool 
of cable in the proscribed clearance zone and that Union 
Pacific is entitled to full indemnity in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 11 of the agreement regardless of 
negligence or fault. 
In Minneapolis-Moline Co. v. Chicago, M., ST. P. 
& P. R. Co., 199 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1952), the railroad 
sought contractual indemnity, under clauses similar to 
those in issue here, from an industry in a situation where 
one of the industry's employees had been injured when a 
train struck a metal box located within the proscribed mini-
mum clearance requirements of the industry track contract. 
-6-
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The court, in holding that the railroad was entitled to 
recover full indemnity from the industry, ruled (1) that 
the railroad, in making the contract covering property 
located on its right of way, acted in a private capacity 
and not as a common carrier and, consequently, could exact 
its own conditions as to occupancy; (2) that the industry's 
obligation to keep the tracks unobstructed was absolute and 
unqualified; (3) that the industry's liability doesn't 
depend upon negligence or tort but that such liability 
arises from breach of contract; and (4) that the industry 
could have made negligence a condition of liability but 
since it didn't it would not be heard to complain of the 
choice it made. With particular application to the present 
case is the statement of the court at page 731: 
The Railroad Company's cause of action 
against the Moline Company, however, is 
not primarily based upon tort, nor is~ 
it dependent upon negligence. The lia-
bility of the Moline Company arises 
from its breach of this indemnity provi-
sion of the contract. The rule as to 
proximate cause is not available to the 
Moline Company because by its contract 
it agreed to indemnify against loss 
"from and against any and all damages, 
remote as well as proximate, in any 
wise resulting from any non-performance 
or non-observance of the foregoing cove-
nant concerning lateral distance or per-
pendicular height, for which the Railway 
Company shall become, in whole or in 
part, liable or be charged." The jury, 
in answer to an interrogatory proposed 
by appellant, found that plaintiff's 
injuries resulted in whole or in part 
-7-
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from "the presence of the trash box within 
six feet laterally at right angles from the 
nearer rail of track 4." It thus appears 
that the damages from which the appellant 
agreed to hold the Railroad Company harm-
less need not have been caused solely by 
any negligence on its part, nor was the 
act of the Moline Company required to be 
the proximate cause of the loss. A lia-
bility resulted even though such act were 
the remote cause. 
The case of John P. Gorman Coal Co. v. 
Louisville & N. R. Co., 213 Ky. 551, 281 
S.W. 487, is strikingly similar in its 
facts to the case at bar. In that case 
the Coal Company agreed to maintain and 
keep the tracks free from obstructions 
and to hold the Railroad harmless on 
account of any loss arising from a viola-
tion of the provision. In the course of 
the opinion it is said: 
"The obligation to keep the tracks 
free from obstruction, and to hold 
the appellee harmless from any claims 
on account of any failure on appellant's 
part to so keep the tracks, is an abso-
lute one. Appellant might have made it 
a condition of liability that it should 
be guilty of some negligence, but this 
it did not do. It was free to make 
any contract it chose so long as it was 
not against public policy, and, having 
chosen to undertake an absolute lia-
bility rather than a qualified one, it 
cannot now be heard to complain of the 
choice it made." [Emphasis added.] 
In Northern P. Ry. Co. v. National Cylinder G. 
Div. of C.C., 2 Wash.App. 338, 467 P.2d 884 (Wash. 1970), 
the railroad was awarded full contractual indemnity from a 
rail welding contractor for injuries sustained by a rail-
road employee whose leg was crushed by a moving rail. The 
court took special note of the fact that the agreement was 
-8-
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silent on the question of whether the negligence of either 
party was relevant to the obligation of the industry to 
indemnify the railroad and concludes that causation rather 
than negligence controlled. In this regard, the court 
states at pages 887-88: 
The trial court commented in its oral 
opinion it was significant the agreement 
at no point mentioned the word "negligent" 
or any concept of fault. It noted the 
language used concerned itself solely with 
the occurrence of an incident which would 
later give rise to a claim or lawsuit .• 
The trial court concluded the agree-
ment was a clear undertaking based upon 
causation rather than negligence or fault 
and had the intention of the parties been 
otherwise, they could clearly and simply 
have provided in the agreement that the 
obligation to indemnify would be subject 
to fault on the part of National in con-
nection with some phase of the welding 
operation. . . . 
National argues that inasmuch as the 
trial court did not find negligence on 
its part, it cannot be required to indem-
nify Northern Pacific. Under the terms 
of the indemnity provision of the contract, 
the trial court's finding that National's 
activities caused the injuries out of 
which the claim arose is sufficient to 
establish liability. [Emphasis added.] 
See also Louisiana & Arkansas R~ Co. v. Anthony, 199 F.Supp. 
286 (W.D. Ark. 1961), aff'd 316 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1963), 
cert. denied 375 U.S. 830 (1963). 
The public policy considerations which this court 
indicated would invalidate Section 5 of the subject lease 
agreement are not violated by the terms of Sections 8 and 
-9-
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11 of said agreement. The latter provisions were not con-
templated to insulte Union Pacific from its own negligence, 
but rather were included for the purpose of requiring Inter-
mountain Farmers to accept liability for any injury to per-
sons caused in whole or in part by its breach of the con-
tract, i.e., placing or maintaining any materials or ob-
structions within the proscribed clearance zone specified 
in the subject lease. The court has never held contractual 
provisions of this nature and scope to be violative of 
public policy. 
POINT III 
THE SUPREME COURT HAS A DUTY TO AFFIRM THE 
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IF SUSTAINABLE 
UPON ANY LEGAL GROUND OR THEORY APPARENT ON 
THE RECORD. 
The presumption of validity attached to a trial 
court's judgment is a basic tenet of the American judicial 
system. The Utah Supreme Court articulated its view of 
this principle in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 
P.2d 86 (1963), by stating at page 89: 
In considering the soundness of the 
trial court's conclusion and judgment . 
certain cardinal rules must be kept in 
mind: That the judgment is endowed with 
a presumption of validity; that the par-
ty attacking it has the burden of affirma-
tively showing that it is in error; and 
that the evidence and all inferences that 
fairly and reasonably may be drawn there-
-10-
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from must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to it. 
Not only must the Supreme Court accord the judg-
ment below a presumption of validity, but it has an affirma-
tive obligation to sustain the judgment even if an alterna-
tive basis for decision must be found. This Court cited 
5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1464(1) favorably in Foss, 
Lewis & Sons Const. Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 
30 Utah 2d 290, 517 P.2d 539 (1973), and then adopted that 
section as a statement of the law of Utah in Goodsel v. 
Dept. of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1974), 
quoting therefrom as follows: 
The Appellate Court will affirm the 
judgment, order, or decree appealed from 
if it is sustainable upon any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, 
even though such ground or theory dif-
fers from that stated by the trial court 
to be the basis of its ruling or action, 
and this is true even though such ground 
or theory is not urged or argued on 
appeal by appellee, was not raised in 
the lower court, and was not considered 
or passed on by the lower court. Id. at 
1232. 
The obligation to sustain the lower court deci-
sion where possible is not merely passive or discretionary 
but is a duty of this court. That duty was recognized in 
Peterson v. Fowler, 29 Utah 2d 366, 510 P.2d 523 (1973), a 
case where summary judgment was sustained on an alterna-
tive theory following a determination that the trial court 
had granted the summary judgment on an erroneous basis. 
-11-
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This Court acknowledged: "It is our duty to sustain the 
rulings made if it can be done even though it be upon a mat-
ter not urged upon appeal." Id. at 526 (emphasis added). 
This case was followed in the Foss, Lewis case, supra, and 
Jones v. Smith, 550 P.2d 194 (Utah 1976), with similar 
results. 
The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from these 
cases is that if the court has a duty to search the record 
for theories not raised upon appeal which would support the 
ruling, then it has an even greater duty to consider altern-
ative theories which were actively advanced by an appellee 
at both the trial and appellate court levels. 
If a judgment is to be endowed with a presumption 
of validity, if that judgment may have been based on either 
of two alternative theories presented to the trial court, 
and if an appellant fails to address one of those theories 
upon appeal, then the appellant has failed to meet its bur-
den of aff irrnatively showing that the judgment is in error 
and it is the duty of this Court to sustain that judgment. 
Such is the case involved in this instance. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court failed in its acknowledged duty to 
sustain trial court judgment, where possible, when it 
reversed the trial court's decision upon a peripheral issue 
advanced by appellant while it ignored the real issue 
-12-
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advanced by the prevailing party and relied on by the court 
below. 
This case should be set for rebriefing and reargu-
ment, and all matters raised by plaintiff and defendant in 
this appeal should be given thorough consideration by this 
court, following which the judgment of the district court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
te n A. Goo sell 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
600 Union Pacific Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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